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Sectoral approaches can be considered part of a transition towards a global carbon 
market. Providing the potentially strongest link between the EU emissions trading 
scheme (EU ETS) and sectoral approaches, sectoral benchmarks can be used for 
setting caps, free allocation, or can become a catalyst for linking carbon markets. 
There would be at least three ways to strengthen the effectiveness of sectoral 
approaches through the choice of performance, metrics, reporting and compliance. 
With the possibility of an increase in decentralisation and flexibility in the post-2012 
architecture, bottom-up approaches would rely heavily on the correct conduct of 
measurement, reporting and verification of mitigation actions in developing countries. 
Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), there would be a 
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THE MERIT OF SECTORAL APPROACHES IN 
TRANSITIONING TOWARDS A GLOBAL CARBON MARKET 
CEPS Special Report/May 2010 
NORIKO FUJIWARA 
WITH ANTON GEORGIEV AND MONICA ALESSI
* 
Executive summary 
The term ‘sectoral approaches’ means different things to different people. There are at least 
three main models of sectoral approaches: industry-led transnational initiatives linked to the 
deployment of sector-specific technologies; bottom-up developing country commitments, 
possibly combined with ‘no-lose’ targets; and a sectoral Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) or sectoral crediting with implications for carbon finance.  
There are a number of industry-led transnational initiatives, including the Cement Sustainability 
Initiative (CSI) under the World Business Council for Sustainable Development as well as 
activities by the International Aluminium Institute and worldsteel (formerly the International 
Iron and Steel Institute). Each sector has developed parameters or formulae for the coverage of 
sub-sectors. There are also different stages involved in benchmarking: i) setting sector 
boundaries, ii) documenting current industry performance based on agreed metrics or key 
performance indicators, and iii) identifying best practices. Consideration of the complexity in 
setting the sector boundary and the feasibility of operation would be preconditions for allowing 
the future inclusion of a relevant sector in a cap-and-trade system. Datasets collected at an 
installation level throughout multinational corporations could be integrated in each sector. The 
sharing and diffusion of best practices among companies would increase operational efficiency. 
Similarly, the diffusion of technology within the sector could contribute to improving the 
performance of the least-efficient installations.  
Sector no-lose targets aim at encouraging emission reductions in a given sector through a form 
of non-binding targets in developing countries, especially in emerging economies. A sector-
crediting baseline would be established by a host country. Credits for reductions below that 
baseline would be issued and could be sold on the international carbon market. A sectoral 
crediting mechanism is seen as an instrument for scaling up financial flows to and investment in 
developing countries. The transition from sectoral crediting to sectoral trading is usually 
considered the halfway point on the evolution path towards a flexible mechanism, starting from 
the current CDM and going through the programmatic CDM, then eventually moving to a cap-
and-trade scheme. These sectoral approaches are not necessarily assumed to be the best option 
but can be considered part of a transition towards a global carbon market. They could coexist 
                                                      
* Noriko Fujiwara is a Research Fellow at Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and Head of the 
Climate Change unit, Anton Georgiev is a Researcher at CEPS and Monica Alessi is a Programme 
Manager at CEPS. This Special Report is based on a final report entitled Study on a method that can set 
the “cap” on GHG emissions and optimally allocate allowances based on countries, industries, and 
installations, and submitted to the Environmental Studies Group, Economic and Social Research Institute 
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with other policies or mechanisms. Unlike transnational initiatives, sectoral crediting or sectoral 
trading is to be implemented domestically in developing countries. Proponents of these 
approaches put more emphasis on the electricity and heating sector than those of industry-led 
transnational initiatives.  
Sector-specific benchmarks form the potentially strongest link between the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and sectoral approaches. First, sectoral benchmarks can 
be used for setting caps. In a subsequent phase (2013–20), the European Commission will be in 
charge of setting an EU-wide cap. The cap will decrease annually by a linear factor compared 
with the average annual quantity of allowances issued by member states. Second, sectoral 
benchmarks can be used for free allocation. The benchmarks will be set Community-wide ex 
ante, and calculated for products. Third, sectoral benchmarks can become a catalyst for linking 
carbon markets. One option is to link carbon markets through agreements to provide for the 
recognition of allowances between the EU ETS and ‘compatible mandatory’ emissions trading 
schemes with absolute caps in any non-EU country or in sub-federal or regional entities. 
Another option is to link carbon markets through non-binding arrangements to provide for 
administrative and technical coordination in relation to allowances in the EU ETS or other 
‘mandatory’ emissions trading schemes with absolute caps.  
The EU calls for the creation of a carbon market across the OECD through linkages by 2015, 
which will be extended to include major emerging economies by 2020. As a step towards 
developing the global carbon market, it envisages a gradual phase-out of the project-based CDM 
for advanced developing countries in a move towards a sectoral crediting mechanism. This 
move would pave the way for introducing and developing cap-and-trade schemes in these 
countries.  
There would be at least three ways to strengthen the effectiveness of sectoral approaches: 
through the choice of performance metrics, reporting and compliance. One approach to 
performance metrics is to use a composite index system. A rough framework, possibly adopting 
the index approach and based on what would be possible to measure, could be negotiated. 
Measurability would be essential for making sectoral approaches operational as part of a post-
2012 framework and is likely to require a common scientific scale of measurement, including 
performance indicators and boundaries. For this purpose, the process underway through the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) could be complemented by the work of 
the International Organisation for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 
and the International Energy Agency. An example of a functioning compliance system can be 
found in the EU ETS; compliance systems are much weaker when based on an effort-sharing 
decision that requires member states to reduce emissions from non-ETS sectors.  
Some preliminary thinking points to the possibility of an increase in decentralisation and 
flexibility in the post-2012 architecture. Decentralised or ‘bottom-up’ approaches would rely 
heavily on the correct conduct of measurement, reporting and verification of mitigation actions 
in developing countries to ensure that the resources provided by developed countries are spent 
effectively. Sectoral approaches could work together with the targets-and-timetables approach 
or with a pledge-and-review model. Otherwise, an ‘action-based’ strategy, which covers sectoral 
approaches, can be regarded as a way of integrating targets and timetables, as they are agreed, 
with consistent and comparable policies and measures. Since the UNFCCC is a framework 
agreement with a longer time horizon as well as a wider coverage of participating countries, its 
scope allows a broader range of issues, including mitigation tools, under a single umbrella. 
Hence, sectoral approaches could have a better chance of developing into part of the post-2012 
framework under the UNFCCC than under the Kyoto Protocol. There will be a hybrid range of 
agreements and mechanisms to make sectoral approaches operational. The simplest option is to 
have only intergovernmental agreements, such as a reporting protocol, as an extension of the THE MERIT OF SECTORAL APPROACHES IN TRANSITIONING TOWARDS A GLOBAL CARBON MARKET | 3 
 
UNFCCC requirements. The other option is to have both intergovernmental agreements and 
agreements negotiated between the government and industry in each entity. Moreover, 
intergovernmental agreements would provide not only for guidelines for domestic legislation 
and regulations but would also set up international mechanisms to reduce the unevenness of 
distributional impacts or increase access for those with less resources to implement policies and 
measures. This combination would make the implementation of domestic measures more 
enforceable.  
In conclusion, the research shows that sectoral approaches could contribute to the development 
of a method that could optimally set a cap on GHG emissions and allocate emission allowances, 
especially (but not exclusively) through benchmarking. Sectoral benchmarking could be built 
upon improvements in boundary setting and data collection, along with best practices. Yet, 
views over the costs associated with and the capacities for sectoral benchmarking differ from 
country to country, especially between developed countries and emerging economies or 
developing countries that are ‘economically more advanced’.  
1. Introduction 
Sectoral approaches are regarded as having the potential to broaden the range of contributions 
by all parties, including emerging economies, to emission reductions in greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), and to help moderate competitiveness concerns in trade-exposed industries. In 
particular, such approaches may help to identify emissions on a sector-by-sector basis and build 
confidence that policies and measures can be put in place to reduce emissions. They can also 
help identify national or global commitments through the aggregation of sectoral data, if 
countries so wish.  
There are different models of sectoral approaches across sectors (e.g. Bodansky, 2007). 
Egenhofer and Fujiwara (2008b) identified at least three main models of sectoral approaches: 
industry-led transnational initiatives linked to the deployment of sector-specific technologies; 
bottom-up developing country commitments, possibly combined with ‘no-lose’ targets; and a 
sectoral Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or sectoral crediting with implications for 
carbon finance. Nevertheless, all the models attempt to combine the following three objectives: 
•  Induce changes to technologies through either the development of new and breakthrough 
technologies or the accelerated deployment of existing technologies, essentially by means of 
cooperation among firms. 
•  Reduce the unevenness of distributional impacts among firms for the same aspect, which 
may arise as a result of uncoordinated local, national or regional climate-change policies. 
•  Engage developing countries in reducing emissions and taking on emission-reduction 
commitments. 
The preconditions to achieve these objectives are as follows: 
•  data collection on the present state of the sector, e.g. emissions (actual and projected), 
information on the applied technologies, technology benchmarks and best practices;  
•  the identification and spread of best practices; and 
•  the development and diffusion of technology. 
This paper considers models of sectoral approaches (sections 2 and 3) and the policy 
implications of such approaches (sections 4, 5 and 6). In looking at industry-led transnational 
initiatives, the paper describes the progress in work on benchmarking in section 2. This model is 
compared with the concept of sectoral crediting in section 3. Section 4 gives an overview of UN 4 | FUJIWARA WITH GEORGIEV & ALESSI 
 
negotiations and the sectoral dimensions of recent policy developments in the EU, in two 
emerging economies (Mexico and China) and the United States (which has not ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol). Section 5 addresses the question of how to strengthen the effectiveness of 
sectoral approaches. Section 6 briefly discusses the challenge of how to develop sectoral 
approaches as part of the post-2012 framework. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. 
2.  Industry-led transnational approaches 
Industry-led transnational initiatives are particularly important in light of their participation, 
momentum or public exposure. This section addresses challenges to transnational approaches, 
especially related to boundary setting, data collection and best practices in benchmarking. In 
this context, this paper mainly looks at initiatives developed by industry and also touches upon 
an example of a public–private partnership, the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate (APP), as well as support for the G8 provided by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA). 
2.1  What drives industry towards transnational sectoral approaches? 
Current initiatives for industry-led, transnational sectoral approaches (e.g. aluminium, cement 
and steel) are driven by twin motives: 
•  moderating concerns about carbon leakage in those industry sectors exposed to international 
competition, owing to asymmetric carbon constraints imposed by uncoordinated domestic 
policies and measures; and  
•  expanding the scope of GHG emission reductions, especially in emerging economies, 
through sector-specific objectives and instruments. 
The rationale for differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has recently grown weaker in energy-
intensive industry sectors that are exposed to international competition, such as aluminium, 
steel, cement, paper and pulp, and organic chemicals. Major companies operating in these 
sectors in Annex I and non-Annex I parties are broadly comparable, except on the availability 
of county-specific resources (e.g. natural gas versus coal or raw material inputs) and the 
ownership of technologies (Egenhofer and Fujiwara, 2008b). Nonetheless, the levels of carbon 
constraints vary significantly because the domestic policies and measures in Annex I parties are 
generally linked to their Kyoto Protocol targets, while non-Annex I parties are not bound by 
quantitative emission-reduction commitments under the Protocol.  
Transnational sectoral approaches are expected to become a promising tool to address this 
dilemma as part of a post-2012 agreement. On the one hand, these approaches could help close 
the growing gap between developed and emerging economies in the levels of carbon 
constraints imposed on competing companies through respective policies and measures. In so 
doing they would ease the concerns about carbon leakage strongly felt in the industry sectors 
exposed to international competition. On the other hand, they could in effect expand the scope 
of enhanced mitigation actions to emerging economies through sector-specific objectives and 
instruments integrated with domestic policies and measures. Cooperation on enhanced 
mitigation actions in industry sectors across countries can be further promoted to develop and 
deploy advanced technologies and to remove identified barriers to technology development and 
deployment.  THE MERIT OF SECTORAL APPROACHES IN TRANSITIONING TOWARDS A GLOBAL CARBON MARKET | 5 
 
2.2 Coverage 
There are a number of industry-led transnational initiatives for sectoral approaches. The cement, 
aluminium, and iron and steel sectors have set up their respective initiatives: the Cement 
Sustainability Initiative (CSI) under the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), activities of the International Aluminium Institute (IAI) and those of worldsteel 
(formerly the International Iron and Steel Institute). The CSI initiative in the cement sector has 
23 major international companies as members, which produce cement in more than 100 
countries. CSI member companies and their affiliates represent over 40% of global cement 
manufacturing.
1 The IAI has 27 member companies worldwide, which are responsible for 80% 
of world aluminium production.
2  A number of non-member companies also submit annual 
GHG-related data. Worldsteel represents approximately 180 steel producers (including 19 of the 
world’s 20 largest steel companies), national and regional steel-industry associations, and steel 
research institutes. Worldsteel covers around 85% of the world’s steel production.
3  
Other than industry-led initiatives, public–private partnerships could also play a role in 
developing transnational sectoral approaches. The APP consists of seven partner countries – 
Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States. Under the 
APP are sectoral taskforces representing three energy-supply sectors (cleaner fossil energy, 
renewable energy and distributed generation, power generation and transmission) and five 
energy-intensive sectors (steel, aluminium, cement, coal mining, buildings and appliances).  
2.3 Boundary  setting
4 
All the initiatives underway promote the collection of information about the status of a sector in 
a transparent way, for example, based on different stages in benchmarking.
5 In a sector-specific 
initiative, drawing a boundary is the first step to benchmarking and a pre-condition for data 
collection. Boundary setting draws a limit around what can be measured against pre-determined 
criteria.  
1.  The product of a company’s activity in a sector, especially if emissions performance is to 
be measured per unit of output  
Standardised single-product outputs such as kWh electricity or tonne of clinker (cement sector) 
are easy to identify sector-wide while multiple products by each plant, such as petrochemicals 
and steel products, make it hard to decide on a common denominator, especially if the product 
mix evolves with time. It is also necessary to decide whether cement or concrete, instead of 
                                                      
1 See the web page, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Cement Sustainability 
Initiative, “About the CSI” 
http://www.wbcsdcement.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=90 
2 See the International Aluminium Institute web page, “About IAI” 
(http://www.world-aluminium.org/About+IAI 
3 See the worldsteel web page, “History and objectives” 
(http://www.worldsteel.org/?action=storypages&id=13). 
4  This section is primarily based on the results of the “Technical workshop on sectoral approaches: 
Benchmarking, sector boundary and monitoring, reporting & verification issues”, Brussels, 17-18 
September 2008, carried out in the context of the study on Global sectoral approaches as part of the post-
2012 framework, supported by the European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry.  
5   Benchmarks can be generally understood as pre-determined performance levels against which 
companies or an entire sector compare their performance. Performance can be expressed in terms of 
agreed indicators such as CO2 emissions per unit of industrial production.  6 | FUJIWARA WITH GEORGIEV & ALESSI 
 
clinker, can be regarded as the final product in order to incorporate the use of other materials 
and off-site operations. 
2.  Whether and how far to go upstream and downstream in the product lifecycle and the 
industry value chain  
The aluminium sector places an emphasis on recycling and scrap utilisation in the 
methodologies of the existing voluntary initiatives that could deliver emission savings. There 
will also be an impact on emissions from final consumer products. For example, making cars 
and trains more lightweight would lead to significant emission reductions. The Chinese iron and 
steel sector has suggested incentivising the creation of an integrated steel plant at the centre of 
an eco-industrial chain because, depending on its vertical integration, a single company may 
have a significant impact on emissions elsewhere along the chain. Upstream activities involving 
fuel use and transport for intermediate products could be accounted for as well. For example, 
shifting from coal to natural gas for on-site fuel could result in a higher carbon footprint for 
upstream operations, especially if liquefied natural gas is used. 
3.  How to deal with indirect emissions  
One of the key issues is if electricity is used instead of combusting fuel in certain sectors, e.g. 
aluminium, or certain processes, e.g. those in the iron and steel sector. There may be a guiding 
principle that could be applied: while power generators are able to control the fuel and GHG 
mix, the producers are able to control the amount of power they use. This has implications for 
choosing energy use rather than GHG emissions as a performance indicator for certain sectoral 
benchmarks. In this respect, it is necessary to decide how to reward on-site electricity co-
generation, such as combined heat and power or even renewable sources. There have been some 
precautionary efforts to avoid including indirect and off-site emissions and thus to prevent 
double counting. 
The energy input for a single product may differ according to the technology and corresponding 
process used, such as wet versus dry for cement clinker, but also for electricity, where 
sometimes several options exist for each fuel source. Especially in the iron and steel sector, it is 
important to draw statistical and system boundaries around processes for precision, but their 
variance by process complicates benchmarking. Differentiating benchmarks by process may 
discourage shifts towards more efficient technologies. Another option is to concentrate on 
technology benchmarks.  
4.  Determining which installations or sectors are to be compared  
Comparisons of installations or a sector may be regional, national or international. Existing 
industry-led initiatives centre on the international level. The best performers would be rewarded 
regionally or nationally, but comparison at these levels may not mitigate concerns about 
international competition or distortions to the market. At the international and national levels, 
the least-developed countries (LDCs) and very small producers could be completely excluded 
from comparison, as investments in state-of-the-art technology may make no economic sense 
with a negligent impact on their emissions. 
Consequently, sectoral characterisation, including boundaries and configuration, has important 
implications for the potential benefits of sectoral approaches. Poor choices for boundaries and 
metrics would limit the potential benefits by overlooking attractive opportunities for mitigation, 
failing to count in certain positive actions, rewarding unproductive activities or creating 
‘gaming’ opportunities, thereby undermining confidence. Sector characterisation should be 
determined in a manner that promotes consistency, avoids double counting, reflects real plant 
conditions, is consistent with measurement protocols and data collection capabilities, and can be 
reproduced and accepted by all parties. THE MERIT OF SECTORAL APPROACHES IN TRANSITIONING TOWARDS A GLOBAL CARBON MARKET | 7 
 
Consideration of the complexity involved in boundary setting and the feasibility of operation 
would be preconditions for allowing the future inclusion of a relevant sector in a cap-and-trade 
system. Boundary setting needs to address the complexity as described in the above criteria, 
capturing some, if not all of the criteria. It may be worthwhile keeping this practice simple for 
international negotiations, but leaving it open to change according to developing countries’ 
national circumstances in the future.  
2.4  Data collection and best practices 
There are two more stages in benchmarking: documenting current industry performance on 
agreed (simple) metrics or key performance indicators; and identifying, sharing and diffusing 
best practices, i.e. comparing the performance of equipment or plants with best practices.  
2.4.1 Data  collection 
Initially, the CSI focused on a data collection exercise called ‘Getting the Numbers Right’, 
including the development of a database for existing technologies in the sector and a 
benchmarking system. The CSI’s data collection covers all countries and regions in which 
members run clinker, cement and grinding operations to give an accurate indication of CO2 
emission levels and energy efficiency in the sector. In the first cycle of data collection, member 
companies submitted data for the years 1990, 2000 and 2005. Data on CO2 emissions and 
energy performance were collected according to the pre-determined parameters.
6 The  latest 
modelling exercise based on the data has recently been published, analysing the impact of 
climate policies on the sector (WBCSD, 2009). 
The central pillar of the IAI’s approach is a database and analysis. The data cover 80% of world 
production and the coverage is being expanded. The industry will report regularly on its global 
recycling performance (IAI, 2009). 
Worldsteel has had a data collection programme since 2008 and a climate-action recognition 
programme since 2009. Their CO2 data collection programme enables every steel-producing 
company to submit its CO2 emissions according to a standardised methodology. This 
measurement framework covers key factors influencing CO2 emissions and energy use. In the 
same year, more than 180 steel-producing sites contributed to this exercise. The database now 
holds CO2 and energy-intensity data for nearly 40% of global steel-production capacity. In 
addition, the climate-action recognition programme recognises steel producers that have met 
their commitment to participating in worldsteel’s CO2 emissions data-collection programme. 
Two-thirds of the association’s membership participated in the first round of data collection 
before early 2009 (worldsteel, 2009).  
Given these current initiatives, the datasets collected at an installation level throughout 
multinational corporations could be integrated in each sector. This approach would allow 
governments to better assess targets, the technical potential for meeting them and the associated 
costs in each sector. In cooperation with industry and other sectors, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) developed indicators to provide the latest data and analysis worldwide on energy 
use and efficiency improvements (IEA 2008). 
                                                      
6 These parameters include specific gross and net CO2 emissions per tonne clinker, cement and cement 
product; absolute gross and net CO2 emissions; thermal energy consumption per tonne clinker; electric 
energy consumption per tonne cement; fuel mix (fossil fuel/fossil alternative fuels and raw 
materials/biomass); and clinker-to-cement ratio. 8 | FUJIWARA WITH GEORGIEV & ALESSI 
 
Further work needs to focus on the measurement, monitoring and verification of data on 
emissions or energy use against the pre-determined baselines and associated costs. Only verified 
data can ensure that industry sectors’ commitments, whether unilaterally set or negotiated with 
governments, would lead to real and measurable emission reductions beyond a business-as-
usual (BAU) scenario. Objective data on emissions and technologies can be used to assess the 
performance of existing installations and to identify future potential to reduce emissions. 
2.4.2 Best  practices 
The next stage in benchmarking is identifying, sharing and diffusing best practices among 
companies to increase operational efficiency. The diffusion of technology within a sector could 
contribute to improving the performance of the least-efficient installations. In one example, 
upon the G8’s request the IEA presented a proposal for an initiative including the dissemination 
of good practice and capacity-building, and reported progress with implementation of energy 
efficiency policies in G8 countries.
7 In another, the APP sectoral taskforces produced a set of 
handbooks for dissemination: a Green Handbook Peer Review prepared by the Power 
Generation and Power Distribution Task force (FEPC, 2007) to describe best practices for 
power generation; and a State-of-the-Art Clean Technology Handbook by the Steel Taskforce 
(Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and American Iron and Steel Institute, 2007) to 
describe best available energy-saving technologies and practices in the iron and steel sector.  
2.5  Potential roles of sectoral benchmarking 
Egenhofer and Fujiwara (2008b) identify four potential roles that sectoral benchmarking could 
play in the development of a global carbon market: 
•  If sectoral performance benchmarks are based on best practices or the best available 
technology in a sector, they could be used for setting a cap on emissions. 
•  Sectoral benchmarks could also be used for allocation, at least as long as free allocation 
continues. 
•  The linkage of carbon markets would be facilitated and accelerated by coordination in 
central design options such as cap-setting, (free) allocation and the monitoring, reporting 
and verification of emissions. Sectoral approaches, notably sectoral benchmarking, could 
facilitate such coordination.  
•  A bottom-up and sectoral approach would gather and provide more robust and more reliable 
data that could be used to formulate post-2012 commitments by developed countries. 
These four potential roles of sectoral benchmarking have policy implications. The first three 
points are examined in light of the EU’s view (see section 4.2.2). The fourth point supports 
proposals for further commitments by developed countries and bottom-up country commitments 
by emerging economies (see sections 4.2-4.4).  
3. Sectoral  crediting 
Sector no-lose targets (SNLTs) aim at encouraging emission reductions in a given sector 
through a form of non-binding targets in developing countries, especially in emerging 
                                                      
7 IEA, “Global Energy Efficiency Action Initiative” and “Progress with implementing energy efficiency 
policies in the G8”, both prepared for the G8 summit in Italy in July 2009 (retrieved from 
www:iea:org/G8/index.asp).  THE MERIT OF SECTORAL APPROACHES IN TRANSITIONING TOWARDS A GLOBAL CARBON MARKET | 9 
 
economies. There would be no penalty for not reaching the target, hence the term ‘no lose’. A 
sector crediting baseline would be established by a host country, in i) intensity goals in terms of 
the emissions intensity of the sector as a whole, e.g. tonnes CO2 (tCO2) per tonne of output or 
per MWh of electricity; ii) fixed emission goals in terms of an absolute total quantity of GHG 
emissions; or iii) technology-based objectives (e.g. Baron et al., 2009; Schneider and Cames, 
2009). Most of the existing proposals assume that the sectoral crediting baseline would be set 
well below the BAU emissions for the mechanism to increase financial flows and mitigation 
actions. Credits for reductions below that baseline would be issued and sold on the international 
carbon market (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Simple depiction of a sectoral crediting baseline 
 
Source: Ward et al. (2008). 
A sectoral crediting mechanism is seen as an instrument for scaling up financial flows to and 
investment in developing countries. Transition from sectoral crediting to sectoral trading is 
usually considered halfway on the evolution path towards a flexible mechanism, starting from 
the current CDM and going through the programmatic CDM, then eventually moving to a cap-
and-trade scheme with binding absolute reductions (e.g. Schneider and Cames, 2009; Baron et 
al., 2009; Aasurd et al., 2009; Fujiwara, 2009; Youngman and Diamant, 2010). These sectoral 
approaches are not necessarily assumed to be the best option but can be considered part of a 
transition towards a global carbon market. They could coexist with other policies or 
mechanisms.  
The sector target for a host country could either be negotiated internationally at the level of the 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC as part of a comprehensive post-2012 agreement 
(Ward et al., 2008) or based on benchmarks to be determined by independent experts for an 
industry sector (Schmidt et al., 2006). One merit of sectoral crediting is that they circumvent the 
need for proof of additionality, one of the main problems associated with the current CDM. An 10 | FUJIWARA WITH GEORGIEV & ALESSI 
 
open question is whether to issue credits to companies performing below the sectoral baseline or 
issue them to the host government.
8  
Unlike transnational initiatives, sectoral crediting or sectoral trading is to be implemented 
domestically in developing countries. Proponents of sectoral crediting and sectoral trading put 
more emphasis on the largest sector for global GHG emissions, the electricity and heating 
sector, than those of industry-led transnational initiatives (see e.g. Amatayakul et al., 2008).  
4. Policy  implications 
Based on an understanding of how the models of sectoral approaches could work, this section 
gives an overview of the sectoral dimensions of recent policy developments, starting with the 
UN negotiations, turning to the EU, two emerging economies (Mexico and China) and closing 
with the US, at both the federal and regional levels. 
4.1  Sectoral approaches in UN negotiations 
In the Bali Action Plan,
9 parties to the UNFCCC (or the ‘Convention’) agreed to launch a two-
year negotiation process with a deadline for conclusion of a comprehensive agreement in 
Copenhagen in December 2009, setting out guidance, direction or destination. For this purpose 
they set up a new Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) 
under the Convention.  
The Working Group has discussed two types of sectoral mechanisms – sectoral crediting and 
sectoral trading – under Art. 1(b)(v) of the Bali Action Plan, more specifically “various 
approaches, including opportunities for using markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and 
to promote, mitigation actions”. In addition, the transnational approach was initially addressed 
in the context of Art. 1(b)(iv) of the Bali Action Plan, which notes the consideration of 
“cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance 
implementation of Art. 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention”.
10 Yet, it has been proposed that 
cooperative sectoral approaches should be associated with nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions (NAMAs) by developing countries (e.g. Aasrud et al., 2009) and that sectoral 
approaches should address emissions that cannot be attributed to any particular economy (e.g. 
international aviation and maritime transport).
11 
                                                      
8 For other design elements, see e.g. Youngman and Diamant (2010) and IETA (2010).  
9 See Decision 1/CP.13, “Bali Action Plan” in the Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth 
session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, Addendum, Part two: Action taken by the conference 
of the Parties at its thirteenth session, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008. 
10 Art. 4.1(c) of the Convention requires governments to “promote and cooperate in the development, 
application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce 
or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all 
relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management 
sectors”. 
11 See Non-Paper No. 49, Contact group on enhanced action on mitigation and its associated means of 
implementation, subgroup on paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the Bali Action Plan (Cooperative sectoral approaches 
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In Copenhagen, the parties agreed to extend the mandate of the AWG-LCA. Moreover, a large 
majority of parties supported the Copenhagen Accord.
12 Art. 1(b)(v) of the Bali Action Plan on 
various approaches has been incorporated into Item 7 of the Copenhagen Accord, which became 
operational immediately. This guidance provided in the Copenhagen Accord needs to be 
substantiated and translated into practical decisions in Cancún in December 2010 or thereafter. 
4.2  Sectoral dimensions of EU climate policy  
4.2.1  The EU’s energy and climate package 
In January 2008, the European Commission presented a package of legislative proposals to 
achieve a target of reducing GHG emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by 2020 (which will be 
raised to a 30% reduction if there is a new international agreement for the post-2012 period) and 
an increase in the share of renewable energy to 20% by 2020. The package included proposals 
for strengthening and broadening the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) from 2013 
and for sharing the emissions reduction effort in non-ETS sectors among member states. In 
December these proposals were approved by both the European Council and the European 
Parliament, meeting the initial timeframe.  
Dividing mitigation efforts between the sectors in the EU ETS and the non-ETS sectors is one 
sectoral dimension of the package. The EU ETS mainly covers electricity and industry sectors. 
Non-ETS sectors include agriculture, transport, buildings and households. More precisely, the 
EU translates the overall target of a 20% cut from 1990 levels into a 14% reduction from 2005 
levels, and further breaks down the 14% target into a 21% reduction in GHG emissions below 
2005 levels for the ETS sectors and a 10% reduction for the non-ETS sectors, ranging from -
20% to 20% across member states. Non-ETS sectors are subject to ‘effort sharing’ among 
member states (for individual limits on member-state GHG emissions, see appendix 1), whereby 
commitments are differentiated according to an economic efficiency approach (i.e. least cost) 
and a wealth indicator (i.e. relative wealth).  
Another sectoral dimension is to assign a single EU-wide cap but apply different allocation 
methods by ETS sector (e.g. the power sector and industry sectors) for a transition period. For 
electricity generation, full auctioning will be introduced from 2013. A compromise has been 
reached, however, for a transitional free allocation of allowances in the sector under certain 
conditions, which will primarily apply to the new member states. Free allocation for the 
modernisation of electricity generation must not exceed 70% in 2013 and will decrease to nil in 
2020. For the industrial sector, auctioning will be phased in over a period of time: in 2013 
installations will receive 80% of allowances free, then 30% by 2020 and nil (i.e. full auctioning) 
in 2027.  
Moreover, against the background of growing concerns about carbon leakage and according to 
Art. 10a (13) of Directive 2009/29/EC,
13  the European Commission identified the industry 
sectors that are considered particularly exposed to international competition at the end of 2009 
(European Commission, 2010a). These sectors would receive free allocation for a limited 
period. There were difficulties in deciding the timing of such an announcement because the EU 
                                                      
12 See Decision 2/CP.15, “Copenhagen Accord” in the Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 March 2010. 
13 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2009/29/EC of 23 April 2009 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading system of the Community, Official Journal of the European Union, L 140/63-87, 5 June 2009(a). 12 | FUJIWARA WITH GEORGIEV & ALESSI 
 
did not want to reveal precise figures prematurely (e.g. the amount of free allowances) to its 
negotiating partners. 
The next section looks more closely at the role of sectoral benchmarks in cap setting, the 
allocation of allowances and linking with other emissions trading schemes. 
A further dimension is to include the aviation sector in the EU ETS. In February 2009, an EU 
Directive (2008/101/EC) incorporating aviation into the EU ETS entered into force.
14 From 
2012 aviation activities will participate in the ETS. All flights landing or taking off from 
airports in the EU will be covered. The Directive aims at capping GHG (initially CO2) 
emissions from the aviation sector to 3% below the average of 2004–06 annual emission levels 
in 2012 and tightening the cap to 5% below the base-year levels for the 2013–20 period (Art. 
3d.1-2). Initially 15% of the allowances will be auctioned and this percentage may be increased 
following the review of the Directive. Each member state will be able to decide on the use of 
auctioning revenues (Art. 3d.4).  
4.2.2  Roles of sectoral benchmarks in the EU ETS 
Egenhofer and Fujiwara (2008a) explore possibilities for linkages between the EU package, 
especially the EU ETS, and sectoral approaches. Sector-specific benchmarks form the 
potentially strongest link between them. In the ETS, the benchmarks developed through sectoral 
approaches could play a role in cap setting or the allocation of allowances, and more generally 
in the expansion of carbon markets.  
First, if sectoral benchmarks are based on best practices or the best available technology in a 
sector, they can be used for setting a cap on emissions. In further guidance for the second phase 
(2008–12) of the EU ETS, the European Commission regarded GDP growth and carbon 
intensity as two of the most important factors driving emissions trends, explicitly using the 
potential for carbon-intensity improvements to assess the member states’ caps and ‘objective’ 
projections based on 2005 verified emissions across the board for all member states.
15  
Art. 9 of Directive 2009/29/EC signals the change in responsibility for cap setting from 
individual member states to the European Commission from the third phase (2013–20) 
onwards.
16 A single EU-wide cap will be placed on annual GHG emissions. The annual cap will 
decrease by a linear factor of 1.74% compared with the average annual quantity of allowances 
issued by member states in accordance with the Commission’s decisions on their national 
allocation plans for the second phase. By the end of June 2010, the Commission will publish the 
absolute EU-wide cap for 2013 based on the total quantities of allowances issued or to be issued 
by the member states. The Commission will review the linear factor and submit a proposal as 
from 2020 with a view to having a decision by 2025. The new approach, adoption of a linear 
decrease in annual caps, means simplification in cap setting and an increase in predictability.  
Second, sectoral benchmarks can be also used for allocation, provided that free allocation 
continues. Art. 10a of the Directive makes explicit reference to “Community-wide ex ante 
                                                      
14 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2008/101/EC of 19 November 
2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community, Official Journal of the European Union, L 8/3, 13 
January 2009(c). 
15  Communication from the Commission, Further guidance on allocation plans for the 2008 to 2012 
trading period of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, COM(2005) 703 final, 22 December 2005. 
16 See Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2009a), op. 
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benchmarks” in considering transitional EU-wide rules for harmonised free allocation.
17 This 
decision intends:  
to ensure that allocation takes place in a manner that gives incentives for reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficient techniques, by taking account of the 
most efficient techniques, substitutes, alternative production processes, high efficiency 
cogeneration, efficient energy recovery of waste gases, use of biomass and capture and 
storage of carbon dioxide, where such facilities are available, and shall not give 
incentives to increase emissions.  
The Directive also notes that the (sub-)sectoral benchmarks will be calculated for products 
rather than for inputs in order to maximise GHG emission reductions and energy savings 
throughout each production process of the sector or sub-sector concerned. The starting point for 
setting  ex ante (sub-)sectoral benchmarks, according to the agreement, will be the average 
performance of the 10% most efficient installations in a sector or sub-sector in the Community 
in the years 2007–08.  
Third, sectoral benchmarks can become a catalyst for linking carbon markets. Art. 25 of the 
Directive suggests two possibilities for agreements in general and non-binding arrangements.
18 
One option is to link emissions trading schemes through agreements to provide for the 
recognition of allowances between the EU ETS and ‘compatible mandatory’ GHG emissions 
trading schemes with absolute emissions caps established in any non-EU country or in sub-
federal or regional entities. Another option is linking through non-binding arrangements with 
these partners to provide for administrative and technical coordination in relation to allowances 
in the EU ETS or other ‘mandatory’ GHG emissions trading schemes with absolute emissions 
caps. Driven by an ambition to develop a global carbon market through linking the EU ETS 
with other domestic cap-and-trade schemes, the EU launched the International Carbon Action 
Partnership together with other countries preparing for emissions trading schemes.  
The EU has called for the creation of a carbon market across the OECD through linking by 
2015, and its expansion to include major emerging economies by 2020 with a view to building a 
global carbon market. Section 4.4 of this paper looks at recent developments in US legislation 
for a federal cap-and-trade scheme, and the launch of a regional cap-and-trade scheme, known 
as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). While linking will likely require 
adjustments in design options among different schemes, it could facilitate sectoral cooperation 
across countries, especially a move to develop global sectoral benchmarks.  
4.2.3  The EU’s call for a sectoral crediting mechanism 
In association with the Copenhagen Accord, the EU reiterated its emissions reduction target of a 
20% reduction from 1990 levels by 2020 and its conditional offer to move to 30%, provided that 
other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that 
developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. The EU is currently examining the possibility of adjusting the 2020 GHG 
emissions target from 20% to 30% reductions,
19  which would alter the assumption of the 
                                                      
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19   Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Analysis of options to move beyond 
20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage, unofficial version, 
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amended ETS Directive and the effort-sharing decision
20 regarding use of CERs/ERUs in the 
third phase. Ahead of the June European Council meeting, the European Commission has been 
asked to outline a pathway for the EU’s transition to a low carbon economy by 2050, develop an 
analysis of milestones on the pathway to 2050 and prepare an analysis of policies that would be 
needed to achieve a 30% emissions reduction. The Commission will also present its analysis on 
the state of energy-intensive industries at risk of carbon leakage with regard to their access to 
free allocation for the ETS in the third phase (European Commission, 2010b).  
As a key element of the future agreement, the EU stresses the role of a strengthened global 
carbon market and aims at developing an OECD-wide market by 2015 and beyond by 2020. 
One of the promising approaches for the development of a global carbon market would be a new 
sectoral crediting mechanism that takes into account the different capabilities of developing 
countries (see Figure 2 and European Commission, 2009a, 2009b and 2010b).  
Figure 2. Developing country emissions 
 
Source: European Commission (2009a). 
As a way of ensuring environmental integrity and improving effectiveness and governance, the 
EU has proposed a reform of the CDM. For advanced developing countries and in highly 
competitive economic sectors, the EU suggests that the project-based CDM should be phased 
out, in a move towards a sectoral crediting mechanism. The CDM would be kept only for LDCs. 
This move would also pave the way for the introduction and development of cap-and-trade 
schemes in developing countries that are economically more advanced. New flexible 
mechanisms are seen as a necessary future step in developing countries’ increasing 
contributions to global mitigation efforts and in scaling up financial flows to these countries for 
their action. The European Commission suggests that the EU ETS legislation
21 should be used 
                                                      
20 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Decision No. 406/2009/EC of 23 April 2009 
on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s 
greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020, Official Journal of the European Union, L 
140/136-148, 5 June 2009(b). 
21 See Arts. 11a(5) and 11a(9) of the EU ETS Directive (2009/29/EC, European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, 2009(a), op. cit.) and Art. 5(2) of Decision No. 406/2009/EC (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009(b), op. cit.). THE MERIT OF SECTORAL APPROACHES IN TRANSITIONING TOWARDS A GLOBAL CARBON MARKET | 15 
 
to incentivise the development of sectoral market mechanisms and to promote the CDM reform 
(European Commission, 2009b and 2010b). 
The EU’s call for a sectoral crediting mechanism presents a set of more concrete research 
questions. Is deviation from the BAU achievable with host countries’ own resources or with 
international support? Their marginal abatement costs will possibly remain lower than those in 
developed countries. Is the suggested figure politically acceptable, especially to developing 
economies? Do they have sufficient financial resources and appropriate technologies to achieve 
the proposed level of emission reductions? If not, how can finance be increased while 
prioritising the delivery of limited resources? A related challenge is how to motivate the private 
sector in scaling up of finance. The last but most important question is whether sectoral 
crediting mechanisms would be the best instrument to address these concerns.  
4.3  Policies and measures in two emerging economies: Mexico and 
China 
Following the above questions about the ability of sectoral crediting mechanisms to address 
concerns such as financial needs, cost-efficiency and political acceptability, this section turns to 
the particular economic circumstances in two emerging economies and their initiatives to tackle 
increasing GHG emissions.  
4.3.1  The untapped potential in emerging economies 
Experience suggests that primary energy use in developing countries can be cut by 30-50% 
because the cost of energy savings is negligible compared with the cost of increasing energy 
supply (Fujiwara and Egenhofer, 2008). While energy intensity started declining mostly as a 
result of structural changes in emerging economies (and to an extent in economies in transition), 
much of the technical potential across the supply, transmission and use of energy is still to be 
tapped. Even so, major challenges remain. Without changes in policy frameworks and 
appropriate instruments to facilitate investment in new technologies, emerging economies are 
likely to follow a carbon-intensive development path. In most emerging economies, there are 
strong pressures for the quick expansion of energy supply, notably for power generation and 
transport fuels, with little short-term emphasis on substituting fossil fuels. Technological 
cooperation combined with capacity building can help in the important area of fuel-switching. 
Most probably, such efforts will necessitate substantial financial transfers from developed to 
developing and emerging economies among other steps towards enhancing adaptive capacity, 
because given their limited domestic sources, the latter will likely continue in most cases to 
prioritise growth over mitigation. Furthermore, the increase of financial transfers can be seen as 
a first sign of developed countries’ determination to fulfil their commitments under the 
UNFCCC to take a lead in the fight against climate change.  
Fujiwara and Egenhofer (2008) call for an action-based approach, presenting a portfolio of 
actions that can be implemented and accelerated on a global scale, especially in the G8+5 
countries and the EU. The portfolio of actions, ranging from energy and industry to transport, 
buildings and appliances, could become a basis on which these developed and developing 
countries can cooperate.  
4.3.2 Mexico 
Mexico will host the next annual climate-change conference in Cancún in December 2010, and 
be expected to potentially bridge the differences that arose among major negotiating groups at 
the Copenhagen conference. In support of the Copenhagen Accord, Mexico submitted its 
national mitigation actions with a GHG emissions reduction target. Mexico aims at reducing its 16 | FUJIWARA WITH GEORGIEV & ALESSI 
 
GHG emissions by up to 30% from the BAU scenario by 2020, given that developed countries 
provide adequate financial and technological support.
22 For the long-term (by 2050), the country 
aspires to reduce emissions by 50% from 2000 levels.
23  This commitment is based on the 
strategy summarised below.  
In 2009, the government adopted its Special Climate Change Program (also known as ‘PECC’ 
in Mexico), which outlines a long-term vision with medium-term goals for mitigation and 
adaptation actions in relevant sectors. In 2012, the full implementation of the programme will 
achieve a reduction in total annual emissions of 51 million tons of CO2e from the BAU, about 
8% of total emissions. From 2008 to 2012, 12 groups of measures in the programme will 
account for 60-70% of the GHG potential.
24  Moreover, the World Bank has developed an 
analysis of a low carbon-development scenario for Mexico (MEDEC), targeted at key emitting 
sectors such as energy, energy end-use and transport. According to the MEDEC study, more 
than half of industrial energy use is concentrated in three sub-sectors: cement, iron and steel, 
and chemicals and petrochemicals. While Mexico’s large-scale industries such as iron, steel and 
cement are among the most efficient, small and medium-sized enterprises accounting for a large 
part of the sector have high levels of energy intensity. The study recommends targeting energy 
efficiency improvements, for example in motor and steam systems or in kilns and furnaces, as 
well as co-generation, which may require change in the regulations on PEMEX (Mexico 
petroleum), a state-owned oil company (Johnson et al., 2009).  
4.3.3 China 
In support of the Copenhagen Accord, China has set several voluntary targets for domestic 
actions, such as reducing CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% from the 2005 level by 
2020 and increasing the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% 
by 2020.
25 Since the Copenhagen conference, China has started legislative work on domestic 
measures to achieve its commitments: amending the renewable energy law to promote wind and 
solar energy, increasing fines against utilities for failing to buy green energy or connect green 
sources to the grid and making a move towards incorporating the carbon intensity commitment 
into the next five-year plan.
26  
China’s strategy to address energy and climate change has been outlined in its National Climate 
Change Programme published in June 2007 and the strategy has been internationally presented 
in a subsequent White Paper published in October 2008 (State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China, 2008). According to the 2009 progress report (National Development and Reform 
Commission, People’s Republic of China, 2009), the energy consumption per unit of GDP 
(energy intensity) has continued to fall, helped by a decline in energy intensity of the major 
energy-intensive industries (e.g. power supply, steel, chemicals, cement and aluminium) since 
2005. China has harvested some of the lowest hanging fruit in its early actions for energy 
efficiency improvements as follows.  
                                                      
22 Letter to Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary, UNFCCC, from the Government of Mexico, 31 January 
2010 (retrieved from http://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php). 
23 J. Martínez Fernández, “Mexico’s Special Program for Climate Change (PECC)”, 9 June 2009. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Letter to Lars Lokke Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark, signed by Wen Jiabao, Premier of the 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 29 January 2010; letter to Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-
General of the United Nations, signed by Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 29 January 2010 (retrieved from http://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php). 
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The Top 1,000 Enterprises Programme was established in 2006. The programme sets a 
significant portion of the overall 20% energy-intensity target on China’s 1,000 largest state-
owned enterprises, mostly in heavy industry, which accounted in 2005 for at least a third of the 
country’s total, primary energy demand and 47% of industrial energy demand (Seligsohn et al., 
2009a). The programme contributed to two-thirds of the country’s energy efficiency gains in 
2006 and half of the gains in 2007 (Price et al., 2008, as quoted in Seligsohn et al., 2009b).  
The government also started a programme for the large-scale closure of many inefficient, small 
industrial plants. In 2008, China closed 16.3GW worth of small thermo-power generating units 
in 325 power plants, and plants with capacities for 53 million tons of cement production, 6 
million tons of steel production and 14 million tons of iron production (National Development 
and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, 2009). 
From 2008, the government required all new coal-fire power plants built in China to use state-
of-the-art, commercially available technology. Consequently, the majority of the world’s most 
efficient, coal-fired power plants are built in China (Nalbandian, 2008 as quoted in Seligsohn et 
al., 2009a). 
Finally, out of the top ten energy conservation projects, six have been developed in the 
industrial sector: the retrofit of coal-fired industrial furnaces (kilns), district co-generation, 
waste heat and residual pressure utilisation, petroleum conservation and substitution, electrical 
motor system energy conservation, and energy system optimisation (National Development and 
Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, 2009; Teng et al., 2009).  
The above measures are only a few among many actions for mitigation and adaptation in China, 
selected for their explicit focus on energy efficiency improvements in industrial sectors. In the 
future, increasing attention will likely be paid not only to implementation but also to the 
measurement, reporting and verification of domestic mitigation actions in China.  
4.4 Sectoral  dimensions of US climate policy 
In association with the Copenhagen Accord, the US reiterated its pledge of GHG emissions 
reduction in the range of 17% below 2005 levels on the condition of support from Congress on 
anticipated energy and climate legislation, which would set a pathway for a 30% reduction in 
2025, a 42% reduction in 2030 and an 83% reduction by 2050.
27 This legislation, including the 
reduction timetable, refers to a forthcoming Senate bill that would mirror the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act (ACESA) passed by the House of Representatives. The following 
sections look at some examples of enacted legislation and current initiatives, and give an 
overview of the ACESA and the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (CEJAPA) 
approved by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW) at the federal 
level and that of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) at the state level. 
4.4.1  Federal cap-and-trade proposals  
To date the most important pieces of legislation that enables the creation of a federal cap-and-
trade scheme are the US ACESA in the House of Representatives and a mirrored act, the 
CEJAPA in the Senate. Additional proposals have been introduced in the Senate: for example, 
the Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal Act (S.2877, Cantwell–Collins) 
introduced in December 2009 (Larsen, 2009) and the American Power Act (Kerry-Lieberman) 
                                                      
27 See the UNFCCC web page, “Appendix I: Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020” 




29 Since the two last proposals are presently under consideration, this section 
only refers to the two passed acts. 
The American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA, H.R. 2454, Waxman–
Markey Bill)
30 
In June 2009, the US House of Representatives passed the Waxman–Markey Bill by a close 
vote (219 to 212). The act passed, ACESA, contains five titles but the following summary 
concentrates on Title III and Title V, to give an overview of the proposed cap-and-trade 
programme mainly focusing on GHG emissions.  
Coverage: The programme covers seven GHGs.
31 Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are subject to a 
separate cap. The sources covered include all power plants and large stationary sources emitting 
more than 25,000 tonnes of GHGs per year. The programme applies to both upstream emissions 
(e.g. petroleum refiners or importers) and downstream ones (e.g. industrial plants and natural 
gas distributors). The GHG cap will expand the coverage in three phases from 2012 through 
2016, up to nearly 85% of US GHG emissions. 
Caps:  The programme sets two caps, a mandatory cap on emissions from the installations 
covered and non-binding, economy-wide, emission reduction goals for all sources. 
Emission caps are 3% below 2005 levels in 2012, 17% below 2005 levels in 2020, 42% below 
2005 levels in 2030 and 83% below 2005 levels in 2050.  
Economy-wide emission reduction goals are the same as the emission caps except the 2020 
target being 20% below 2005 levels. 
Allocation: The majority of allowances are to be distributed for public benefits including 
consumer benefits. Low- and moderate-income households will also receive a tax credit or 
rebate. Auctions will start in March 2011. Initially, about 20% of allowances will be auctioned. 
The share of auctioning will increase over time to about 70% by 2030 and beyond. There will be 
a strategic allowance reserve for auction. The initial minimum price for 2012 will be $28 and 
the price for 2013–14 will be the 2012 price increased by 5% plus the inflation rate. From 2015, 
the minimum reserve price will be 60% above the three-year rolling average of the market price. 
No more than 20% of the compliance obligation may be annually purchased from the strategic 
reserve.  
Timing: The compliance period is two years with unlimited banking. Borrowing from the next 
year is unlimited and with no interest, but borrowing from the second to fifth years is limited up 
to 15% of the compliance obligation and at 8% annual interest.  
Offsets: The programme allows up to 2 billion tonnes of offsets to be used for compliance: 1 
billion from domestic projects (forestry and agriculture overseen by the Department of 
Agriculture) and 1 billion from international programmes or projects. If the domestic supply is 
                                                      
28 Also see, letter to President Barack Obama, signed by J. Kerry, J.I. Lieberman, L.O. Graham, 10 
December 2009 (retrieved from http://kerry.senate.gov/newsroom/pdf/Climate_Framework.pdf).  
29  See also “Climate actions in congress”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change (retrieved from 
www.pewclimate.org). 
30 The summary of this bill is based on the following sources: “Waxman–Markey short summary”, Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change, 26 June 2009 (retrieved from www.pewclimate.org) and Larsen et al. 
(2009a).  
31   The seven gases are CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
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not sufficient, the Environmental Protection Agency can raise the use of international offsets up 
to 1.5 billion. From 2018 there will be discount for international offsets: 1.25 offset credits for 
each tonne of emissions. There will be no discount for domestic offsets. The programme 
approves the issuance of offset credits based on sectoral crediting mechanisms targeted at 
sectors in eligible countries. Credits may also be issued in exchange for credits issued by other 
programmes (e.g. the CDM) that create equal or greater assurance of the environmental integrity 
of the US programme. 
Cost containments: Sectors are presumed to be eligible for rebates if they meet i) a 5% energy 
or GHG-intensity threshold and a 15% trade intensity or ii) a 20% energy or GHG-intensity 
threshold. Each sector is rebated at 100% of the direct and indirect emissions cost on average. 
Rebates will be phased out from 2025 in principle. If no international agreement is reached 
before January 2018 to address competitiveness concerns, the president will establish an 
international reserve allowance programme to adjust the price of energy-intensive imports at the 
border.  
The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (CEJAPA, S.1733, Kerry-Boxer)
32 
The Senate Committee on EPW passed the CEJAPA in November 2009. The final bill draws 
heavily from ACESA (Waxman–Markey Bill), for example, in setting a cap-and-trade scheme, 
but differs in several aspects such as the 2020 target. While the ACESA is comprehensive and 
encompasses clean energy and climate change, this bill mainly focuses on GHG emission 
reductions. The following summary concentrates on provisions concerning the cap-and-trade 
scheme, mainly focusing on GHG emissions.  
Coverage: The programme covers the same seven GHGs covered in the ACESA. HFCs are 
subject to a separate cap. Perflurocarbons (PFCs) may be also regulated separately under 
performance standards. The sources covered include power plants and large stationery sources 
with annual GHG emissions over 25,000 tonnes. The programme applies to both upstream and 
downstream emissions. The cap will expand the coverage in several phases over a five-year 
period. By 2016, almost 85% of national GHG emissions will have been covered under the cap.  
Caps:  The programme sets two caps: a mandatory cap on emissions from the installations 
covered and non-binding, economy-wide, emission reduction goals for all sources. 
The 2020 emissions cap is more stringent than that under the ACESA, i.e. a 20% cut from 2005 
levels in 2020. Other emission caps are the same as those in the ACESA: 3% below 2005 levels, 
42% below 2005 levels in 2030 and 83% below 2005 levels in 2050. Economy-wide goals are 
same as those in the ACESA. 
Allocation: Consumer benefits are taken into account in allocation. Auctions will start in March 
2011. There will be a market stability reserve for auction. The minimum reserve price for 2012 
will be $28 per tonne in 2005 dollars and increase by 5% from 2013 through 2017 and by 7% 
thereafter plus the inflation rate on top of the previous year’s reserve price. 
Timing: The compliance period is two years with unlimited banking and limited borrowing. 
Offsets: The total limit on offset use is the same as that in the ACESA but the division between 
the domestic and international offsets differs. The programme allows use of 2 billion tonnes of 
qualified offsets per year, with 1.5 billion from domestic projects (forestry and agriculture 
overseen by the Department of Agriculture) and 0.5 billion from international projects or 
                                                      
32 This section is based on the following sources: “Summary of the Clean Energy Jobs and American 
Power Act (S.1733) as passed by the EPW Committee”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 
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programmes. If domestic supply is not sufficient, the use of international offsets can be 
increased up to 1.25 billion. Like the ACESA, this programme will set a discount for 
international offsets: after 2018, 1.25 international offsets for each tonne of emissions. The 
programme also allows the use of offset credits based on sectoral crediting mechanisms in 
eligible countries and the issuance of credits in exchange for credits issued by other programmes 
(e.g. the CDM) that give equal or greater assurance of the environmental integrity of the US 
programme. 
Cost containments: Sectors are presumed to be eligible for rebates under the same conditions 
as described in the ACESA. Each sector is rebated at 100% of the average direct and indirect 
emissions cost. Rebates will be phased out from 2025 in principle. A placeholder section opens 
the possibility for including border measures to complement the rebate provisions.  
Lastly, it is worth mentioning in relation to the next section that the CEJAPA temporarily 
prohibits states from running their own cap-and-trade programmes until 2017.  
4.4.2  Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
33 
The RGGI is the first mandatory cap-and-trade programme for GHG emissions in the US to 
limit or ‘cap’ CO2 emissions from large electricity-generating installations fired by fossil fuels. 
RGGI entered into effect and started regulating CO2 emissions on 1 January 2009. A series of 
auctions for emission allowances has taken place since September 2008. 
Coverage: The programme covers CO2 emissions from electricity-generating installations fired 
by fossil fuels of at least 25 MW that burn more than 50% fossil fuel (approximately 225 
facilities region-wide). The power-generating installations covered account for about 28% of 
CO2 emissions in a region consisting of 10 north-eastern and mid-Atlantic states
34 in the US.  
Cap: The cap aims at stabilising emissions from 2009 through 2014 to the level roughly equal 
to historical emissions. From 2015 to 2018, the cap on emissions will decline by 2.5% per year 
over the next four years, thus in 2018 reaching a level that is 10% lower than the baseline. 
Allocation: Each state’s programme determines its share of the regional cap, 188 Mt for the 10 
states. Each state then issues allowances in a number equivalent to its share of the regional cap. 
States have agreed to allocate at least 25% of the allowance for consumer benefits or strategic 
energy purposes (e.g. renewable energy and energy efficiency). They may choose how to 
allocate the remaining 75% of their allowances. Yet the trend shows that states distribute 
allowances primarily through auctions. Initially, over 85% of the region’s allowances are 
expected to be auctioned in the early stages of the programme. Eventually, the auctioned share 
is expected to rise to over 90%.  
Timing: The compliance period is three years, starting with the first period of 2009–11. The 
programme allows unlimited banking.  
                                                      
33  This section is based on the following sources: RGGI Fact Sheet, “Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative”, 22 April 2009 (www.rggi.org); “Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Programme”, 
October 2007 (www.rggi.org); WRI Fact Sheet, “Regional cap-and-trade programs”, World Resources 
Institute, July 2009 (retrieved from www.wri.org); WRI and Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 
“Overview of Regional Initiative’s offset programs” (www.wri.org); “Q&A: Regional greenhouse gas 
initiative”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change (retrieved from www.pewclimate.org). 
34 The states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
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Offsets: A power plant is allowed to use offsets to meet up to 50% of emission reductions from 
BAU projections, equivalent to 3.3% of its compliance obligations. If allowance prices rise 
above thresholds, more offsets may be allowed (see below).  
Cost containment: There are two safety valve (or price trigger) provisions. If the ‘stage-one 
price trigger’ is reached (i.e. the allowance price rises above $7/short tonne on average), the use 
of offsets increases by up to 5% of the facility compliance obligation. If the ‘stage-two price 
trigger’ is reached (i.e. the allowance price rises above $10/short tonne on average),
35 the 
compliance period will be extended by one year, to maximum of four years and use of offsets 
will increase by up to 10% of the facility compliance obligation. Under the stage-two price 
trigger, the programme will also approve the use of international credits, such as those generated 
from the CDM.  
5.  How to strengthen the effectiveness of sectoral approaches? 
There would be more than one way to improve the effectiveness of sectoral approaches. This 
section examines difficulties with the choice of performance metrics, reporting and compliance, 
drawing some examples from existing systems such as the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and 
the EU.  
5.1  Choice of performance metrics
36 
There is a recommendation to include as many performance components as possible, thus 
balancing between them i) fuel use, electricity use and GHG emissions; ii) relative (intensity) 
and absolute bases; and iii) on-site and off-site fuel use and GHG emissions (Newman, 2009). 
This task could be done by using a composite index system based on the Solomon index, 
spanning a number of performance components. 
Considering the complexity in data availability and measurability, there is a suggestion for a 
simpler way to use such composite indices to operationalise benchmarking in negotiations. The 
target level for these reference intensities may be arbitrarily decided like a ‘yardstick’. An index 
for comparison may be useful in certain sectors with a large number of measurement needs. For 
example, in the steel sector seven parts of the process require measuring, which may be too 
many for effective negotiations. Detailed benchmarks could still make sense in homogenous 
industries or in sectors like cement and aluminium, which appear to require a smaller number of 
measurements. 
Therefore, a rough framework, possibly taking the index approach and based on what would be 
possible to measure, could be negotiated. In addition, different performance indicators may be 
used for different countries as a basis for measurable commitment. As seen in the list of pledges 
of national commitments associated with the Copenhagen Accord, various national 
circumstances usually result in diverse preferences in the choice of benchmarking performance 
metrics, i.e. indicators and standards.  
                                                      
35 The price trigger is reached if the 12-month rolling average CO2 allowance price reaches or exceeds the 
trigger price. The trigger price is set in 2005 dollars and will be adjusted each year according to the 
consumer price index for the stage-one trigger price or the price index plus 2% for the stage-two trigger 
price. 
36 This section is primarily based on the results of the “Technical workshop on sectoral approaches: 
Benchmarking, sector boundary and monitoring, reporting & verification issues”, Brussels, 17-18 
September 2008, carried out in the context of the study on Global sectoral approaches as part of the post-
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5.2 Reporting 
Among the three stages of measurement, reporting and verification, international cooperation 
and coordination are most developed in the area of reporting. This section introduces both the 
UNFCCC requirements and other protocols for measuring and reporting progress.  
5.2.1  UNFCCC reporting requirements 
The core data around which UNFCCC negotiations revolve are provided in the GHG 
inventories. These are provided by means of national communications and reports submitted to 
the UNFCCC Secretariat in accordance with Arts. 4 and 12 of the Convention.  
The reporting requirements differ for Annex I and non-Annex I parties. The UNFCCC reporting 
guidelines on Annex I inventories
37 provide the requirements for developed countries, while the 
guidelines for the preparation of national communications for non-Annex 1 parties
38 address the 
developing countries’ requirements.
39  
For Annex I countries, the inventory data are provided in annual GHG inventory submissions, 
which are then reviewed in-depth by international teams of independent experts, typically by 
means of in-country visits. A review report is then provided annually for each party. 
For non-Annex I parties, the inventory data are provided in the national communications under 
the Convention. Non-Annex I parties are not required to submit an annual GHG inventory, and 
the national communications are not subject to in-depth reviews. The national communications 
contain information about most of the covered gases by sector. The level of compliance has in 
general been satisfactory, but comparability is thwarted by a change in the UNFCCC 
guidelines: while current guidelines require Non-Annex I countries to estimate GHG inventories 
for the year 2000, many reports present data for other years, based on previous guidelines. A 
number of Non-Annex I countries, in particular LDC parties, still face reporting difficulties 
because of a lack of resources.
40  
To manage the data obtained through reporting and render it accessible to the public, the 
Secretariat has created the Greenhouse Gas Information System.
41  The data is presented in 
various breakdowns (by sector, gas and year). 
5.2.2  Progress in measurement and reporting protocols 
In the cement sector, significant progress has been made towards common, new benchmarking 
methodologies. Companies under the CSI have agreed on a cement CO2 protocol as a 
harmonised methodology for calculating and reporting their emissions (CSI, 2005). All the 
direct sources and major indirect sources of CO2 emissions related to the manufacturing process 
are covered in absolute as well as specific or unit-based terms. Since its creation in 2001, the 
protocol has been updated (in 2005) based on the extensive experience of companies worldwide 
in applying it. It has been aligned closely with the World Resources Institute (WRI)/WBCSD 
GHG Protocol encompassing all types of sectors, which was published in 2001 and updated in 
                                                      
37 See United Nations, FCCC/SBSTA/2004/8. 
38 See United Nations, Decision 17/CP.8. 
39 See the UNFCCC web page, “GHG data from UNFCCC” 
http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php  
40 UNFCCC, Fact Sheet, “UNFCCC emissions reporting”, June 2009, www.unfccc.int. 
41 See the UNFCCC web page, “Greenhouse gas inventory data”  
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2004.
42 Moreover, the CSI, together with Ecofys, has developed a sectoral benchmarking CDM 
methodology to be used for plant performance derived from its global cement database on CO2 
and energy information, “Getting the Numbers Right (GNR)”.
43 
In addition, a Benchmarking and Energy Saving Tool (BEST)
44 for the cement industry in China 
has been developed by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory with collaborating institutes. 
It takes into account only the energy performance of cement production. Using this tool for self-
assessment, the plants are able to benchmark their energy use against best practice levels and 
evaluate energy efficiency measures.  
Ecofys has also created sector proposal templates for developing national crediting baselines 
under sectoral crediting with SNLTs in the power generation, cement and transport sectors.
45 
Although the baseline does not have to result from benchmarking, collecting detailed and 
transparent data is essential. Thus, the templates can be used as a capacity-building tool in 
developing countries for addressing such data and measurement issues.
46 
Apart from the WRI/WBCSD GHG Protocol and the Cement CO2 Protocol, existing 
measurement protocols include the EU ETS monitoring and reporting guidelines.
47 Also, the 
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), together 
with the American Petroleum Institute and the International Association of Oil & Gas 
Producers, has developed Petroleum Industry Guidelines for Reporting Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (IPIECA, 2003). This method for reporting GHG emissions can be used by oil and 
gas companies from any part of the world, but there is no indication of whether they are suitable 
for sectoral benchmarking and measurement, reporting and verification. Progress on common 
protocols in other energy-intensive sectors, especially iron and steel, has been slower owing to 
the boundary-setting and other measurement complexities described above. 
Measurability is essential for making sectoral approaches operational as part of a future 
international, climate policy framework and is likely to require a common scientific scale of 
measurement, including performance indicators and boundaries. The Japanese government has 
foreseen several steps.
48 First, the UNFCCC process could involve the participation of public 
and private industrial experts, especially from the existing industry initiatives and associations 
(worldsteel, IAI, CSI, etc.). Next, the International Organization for Standardization 
                                                      
42 “The GHG protocol: A corporate accounting and reporting standard”, retrieved from the Greenhouse 
Gas Protocol website (http://www.ghgprotocol.org). 
43 See the WBCSD-CSI’s webpage, “Sectoral CDM Benchmarking Methodology”, 
http://www.wbcsdcement.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=59&Itemid=120  
44   See the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s webpage, “Benchmarking”, http://industrial-
energy.lbl.gov/node/100  
45 For further information, see the Sectoral Proposal Templates website (www.sectoral.org). 
46 See M. Jung et al., “Sector proposal templates – Overview and lessons learnt”, presentation at the 
“Technical workshop on sectoral approaches: Benchmarking, sector boundary and monitoring, reporting 
& verification issues’, Brussels, 17 September 2008; on capacity building, see also Fujiwara et al. (2010). 
47 Commission Decision 2007/589/EC of 18 July 2007 establishing guidelines for the monitoring and 
reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, Official Journal of the European Union, L229/1-85, 31 August 2007. For amendments 
adopted to the Decision in 2008-09 see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/mrg_en.htm  
48  See J. Arima, “Sectoral Approaches: Applications and Challenges”, presentation at the “Technical 
workshop on sectoral approaches: Benchmarking, sector boundary and monitoring, reporting & 
verification issues”, Brussels, 17 and 18 September 2008; see also H. Fujisawa, “Key issues to 
operationalise SA”, presentation at the “Technical workshop on sectoral approaches: Benchmarking, 
sector boundary and monitoring, reporting & verification issues”, Brussels, 17 and 18 September 2008. 24 | FUJIWARA WITH GEORGIEV & ALESSI 
 
(ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) process of developing common 
standards could authorise the UN process. Finally, the ISO/IEC could simultaneously 
collaborate with international organisations such as the IEA, which has already developed 
energy efficiency indicators. It would be useful to base these steps on the ongoing collaboration 
between the WBCSD and the WRI with the ISO on joint promotion of the WRI/WBCSD GHG 
Protocol standards and the ISO 14064 standard for GHG accounting and reporting (WBCSD, 
2007). 
5.3  A compliance system for sectoral approaches 
One possible way to enhance the effectiveness of sectoral approaches would be to have an 
embedded compliance system. This section first illustrates how the compliance system of the 
Kyoto Protocol works, and then turns to that of the EU ETS. A significantly weaker 
arrangement for compliance with the agreement on non-ETS sectors is also introduced.  
5.3.1  Compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol 
The issue of compliance is central to international agreements, and has proved a challenge in 
particular for international environmental law. The Kyoto Protocol contains a compliance 
mechanism (Art. 18) to ensure that parties meet their commitments. Specific procedures and 
mechanisms were introduced in the first meeting after the entry into force of the Protocol.
49 
Under this framework the Compliance Committee has been operational since March 2006. Its 
backbone is composed of two branches, the ‘facilitative branch’ and the ‘enforcement branch’. 
This structure is the first of its kind, and allows for both preventive and reactive actions. The 
facilitative branch provides technical and financial advice to parties facing difficulties in 
meeting their commitments. The enforcement branch is responsible for ensuring that the parties 
comply with their commitments. The compliance tools range from i) ‘declarations of non-
compliance’, aimed at applying moral pressure through a reputation effect; ii) the request to the 
party concerned to present a plan analysing the causes on non-compliance and indicating the 
corrective measures; and finally iii) the possibility to suspend eligibility for participation in the 
flexible mechanisms. The latter sanction depends heavily on the good functioning and the 
attractiveness of the market mechanisms, whereby exclusion might mean substantial 
disadvantages.  
A case of non-compliance with emission targets cannot come before the enforcement branch 
until after the end of the commitment period in 2012. Up to now, the compliance cases that have 
been eligible to be brought before the enforcement branch have been limited to matters of 
procedure or implementation (e.g. registry and reporting issues). To date there have been four 
cases – against Greece, Canada, Croatia and Bulgaria. Greece and Bulgaria’s cases focus on the 
national system, including arrangements for estimating emissions and sinks covered by the 
Protocol and for reporting and archiving this information. Canada’s case relates to the national 
registry. Croatia’s case is concerned with the assigned amount and the commitment period. In 
conclusion, Greece and Canada were found in non-compliance on the final decision and on the 
preliminary decision respectively, but as they remedied the situation, the cases were 
subsequently closed. Croatia expressed disappointment with the final decision of non-
compliance. Bulgaria has been found in non-compliance in the preliminary decision.
50  
                                                      
49 See Decision 27/CMP.1. 
50 See the UNFCCC web page, “The compliance under the Kyoto Protocol” 
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A major drawback to the mechanism, however, is that the enforcement branch cannot operate in 
a binding fashion. Any procedures and mechanisms entailing binding consequences (Art. 18, 
Kyoto Protocol) will require the adoption of an amendment. Agreement on such an amendment 
has not been reached so far and has met with strong opposition. As a result, the compliance 
mechanism is presently weakened by the fact that it is not binding. While the compliance 
procedure allows consideration of sanctions, the ‘facilitation’ aspect will significantly override 
the ‘enforcement’ aspect (Maljean-Dubois, 2007) unless an amendment is adopted.  
5.3.2  A compliance system for sectoral approaches: An example of the 
EU 
An example of a functioning compliance system can be found in the EU ETS. The EU scheme 
has a robust compliance system from an institutional perspective. Art. 16 of the EU ETS 
Directive describes procedures for consequences in the case of non-compliance, i.e. penalties. 
The penalty started with €40/tCO2-e in the first phase (2005–07) but amounts to €100/tCO2-e in 
the second phase (2008–12). The non-compliance penalty will further increase from €100/tCO2-
e in the third phase (2013–20) in accordance with the European Index of Consumer Prices (i.e. 
the inflation rate) to maintain a deterrent effect.
51 Moreover, payment of the penalty will not 
release the operator from the obligation to surrender in the following year an amount of 
allowances equal to the excess emissions.  
While installations in the ETS sector (i.e. the electricity and industry sectors) are subject to a 
relatively strong compliance system, member states will not be held liable for breaching their 
individual targets limiting GHG emissions from non-ETS sectors. Under Art. 7 on “corrective 
action” of Decision 406/2009/EC, member states will have to compensate for underperformance 
in the following year. For this purpose, the excess emissions will be multiplied by a mandatory 
climate ‘abatement factor’ of 1.08, reducing emission allowances for the following year.
52 
6.  Sectoral approaches as part of the post-2012 framework 
A reference to sectoral approaches in the Bali Action Plan means that there is a chance for them 
to become part of the post-2012 framework. They could be linked to other priority issues, such 
as further commitments by developed countries, NAMAs by developing countries, financing 
and technology. This section first discusses the shape of the post-2012 architecture and then 
how sectoral approaches can fit into the post-2012 framework. 
6.1  Decentralisation and flexibility in the post-2012 architecture 
Although it is difficult to speculate much on the prospects of reaching a post-2012 agreement, 
some preliminary thinking has developed over how the future framework might look. It is 
suggested that the post-2012 architecture will likely have a more decentralised and flexible 
architecture than its predecessor. It would entail less rigidity in the overall architecture, 
reflecting a shift in the economic capabilities of parties, increasing mobility among groups of 
countries on the ladder of making strong commitments and enlarging a portfolio of instruments 
to meet commitments – including innovative tools of tradable units to enable a variety of actions 
contributing to the GHG emission reductions to be counted (Fujiwara, 2008). It is even argued 
that a pledge-and-review model for supporting technology, finance and capacity building could 
                                                      
51 See Directive 2009/29/EC, European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009(a), op. cit. 
52 See Decision No. 406/2009/EC, European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009(b), op. 
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fit into the decentralised approach favoured by the Bali Action Plan (Doornbosch and Knight, 
2008). Such decentralised approaches (which we call ‘bottom-up’) would rely greatly on the 
correct conduct of measurement, reporting and verification of mitigation actions in developing 
countries to ensure that the resources provided by developed countries are spent effectively. 
Clear targets and timetables are needed. Measurement, reporting and verification are required 
for NAMAs by developing countries in accordance with the Bali Action Plan.  
6.2  How can sectoral approaches fit into the post-2012 framework? 
There is a set of questions about fitting sectoral approaches into the negotiation strategy and the 
post-2012 framework per se. The starting point is how sectoral approaches can be applied to the 
targets-and-timetables approach used under the Kyoto Protocol. Sectoral approaches could work 
together with the targets-and-timetables approach or with a pledge-and-review model. 
Otherwise, an action-based strategy, which covers sectoral approaches, can be regarded as a 
way of integrating targets and timetables, as they are agreed, with consistent and comparable 
policies and measures (Fujiwara and Egenhofer, 2008). Section 3 above introduced bottom-up, 
developing country commitments with an option of SNLTs (Ward et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 
2006). Transition from sectoral crediting to sectoral trading could act as a stepping-stone on the 
evolution path towards a flexible mechanism, moving from the current CDM towards a cap-and-
trade scheme with binding absolute reductions. They could exist side by side with other tools on 
different stages of the evolution path. Since the UNFCCC is a framework agreement with a 
longer time horizon as well as a wider coverage of participating countries, its scope allows a 
broader range of issues, including mitigation tools, under a single umbrella. Hence, sectoral 
approaches could have a better chance of developing into part of the post-2012 framework 
under the UNFCCC than under the Kyoto Protocol. Section 4.1 illustrated the state of play in 
UN discussions, chiefly under the AWG-LCA track. 
As section 5 outlined, there will be a hybrid range of agreements and mechanisms to make 
sectoral approaches operational.
53  The simplest option is to have only intergovernmental 
agreements such as a reporting protocol, as an extension of the UNFCCC requirements. Other 
measurement and reporting protocols could be recorded in a UN registry but remain optional for 
parties to adopt. The other option is to have both intergovernmental agreements and agreements 
negotiated between the government and industry in each entity. The former provides the 
government with guidelines for formulating the latter. Lessons have been learned from the EU’s 
experience in implementing the EU ETS, especially in formulating national allocation plans 
along the EU monitoring and reporting guidelines in the first two phases (2005–07 and 2008–
12). Moreover, intergovernmental agreements would not only provide for guidelines for 
domestic legislation and regulations but also set up international mechanisms to reduce the 
unevenness of distributional impacts or increase access for those with less resources to 
implement policies and measures, e.g. mechanisms for facilitating access to finance or 
technology. The EU ETS will create mechanisms for the distribution of allowances to be 
auctioned by member states: one is to increase the share of allowances of 19 member states (see 
appendix 2) and another is to count the early efforts of 9 member states in their share of 
allowances (see appendix 3). This combination would make the implementation of domestic 
measures more enforceable. Nevertheless, regardless of the variation, any new system would 
not exempt parties from existing commitments to the UNFCCC, including national 
communications. 
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7. Concluding  remarks 
Research shows that sectoral approaches could contribute to the development of a method that 
could optimally set a cap on GHG emissions and allocate emission allowances, especially (but 
not exclusively) through benchmarking. Sectoral benchmarking could be built upon 
improvements in boundary setting and data collection, along with best practices. The 
importance of this method is common to all three models – industry-led transnational initiatives, 
bottom-up developing country commitments and sectoral crediting. Yet, views over the costs 
associated with and capacities for sectoral benchmarking differ from country to country, 
especially between developed countries and emerging economies or developing countries that 
are economically more advanced. Even if sectoral approaches form part of a post-2012 
agreement, an agreed outcome will likely cover some basic principles for benchmarking and 
frameworks for further discussions on the technical details.   
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G8+5  Group of Eight plus the heads of government of the five leading emerging 
economies 
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MW Megawatt 
NAMAs  Nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
NDRC  National Development and Reform Commission (China) 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PECC  Programa Especial de Cambio Climático (Mexico’s Special Programme on 
Climate Change) 
PEMEX  Petróleos Mexicanos (Mexican Petroleum) 
PFC Perfluorocarbon 
RGGI  Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
SA  Sectoral approaches  
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2e  Metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent  
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Appendix 1. Member-state GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors for the 
period 2013–20
* 
Member state  Member-state GHG emission limits in 2020 




























                                                      
* Adapted from Annex II of the effort sharing Decision (406/2009/EC, European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, 2009b.  
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Appendix 2. Increase in the share of allowances to be auctioned by 
member states
* 




























                                                      
* Adapted from the table in Annex IIa of the EU ETS Directive (2009/29/EC, European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, 2009a.  
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Appendix 3. Distribution of allowances to be auctioned by member states 
reflecting the early efforts of some member states
* 
Member state  Distribution of the 2% against the Kyoto base (%)  
Bulgaria 15 









                                                      
* Annex IIb of the EU ETS Directive (2009/29/EC, European Parliament and Council of the European 
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